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In fast-paced industries such as high-tech industry, time-to-market is
one of the key strategic decisions to be made. With competition, firms
not only need to consider market readiness but also should try to
optimize new product launch timing by balancing the tradeoff between
advantages and disadvantages of becoming a pioneer. Would a firm
compete head-to-head by accelerating the project, or wait and then
follow-up quickly after uncertainties clear up? The current paper
illustrates how we can examine this issue by introducing an empirical
modeling approach based on duration analysis. Specifically, a hazard
function approach is taken to analyze time-based competition, and the
proposed model demonstrates for the first time in the marketing
literature the possibility to capture the relational structure between two
competing hazard rates. Though the empirical question could not be
answered due to data availability, a Monte-Carlo simulation study
assures the usefulness of the model. 
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INTRODUCTION
Time-to-market is becoming an increasingly important
strategic decision in fast-moving high-tech industries such as
computers and electronic devices. Being first to market has long
been one of the key commitments that many successful
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technology-based companies such as Du Pont, 3M, Hewlett
Packard and Intel have made. However, after observing failure of
several “great” firms(e.g. IBM, Apple, Xerox, Digital, etc.) in the
last decade or so, high-tech firms have come to realize that being
first does not guarantee success. In fact, the firms need to
optimally choose time-to-market strategy in a way that
maximizes the market premium from early(or not too late) entry
while minimizing potential costs of entering an immature
market.  
Time-to-market decision gets even more complicated when
competition is involved. That is, firms not only need to consider
market readiness, but they also should try to well balance the
tradeoff between advantages and disadvantages of becoming a
pioneer. However, despite the vast literature on whether it is
better to be a pioneer or a fast follower, marketing scholars don’t
seem to have reached a clear conclusion. The main objective of
the current paper is to illustrate how we can examine this issue
using hazard function approach.
Recently, Datar et al.(1997a) defined three critical stages of the
product development process(concept generation, prototype
completion, and volume production) and examined the lead-time
advantages in those stages. Their main findings are as follows.
First, the lead-time advantage exists at each stage, the benefit
being greatest at volume production stage. Second, the lead-time
threshold is present in both the concept generation and volume
production stage, i.e. no market share gain of first-mover is
observed if a competitor catches up within threshold. Datar et al.
(1997b) also examined, in another paper, the impact of R&D
strategies on time-to-market for the latter two stages(prototype
completion, volume production) using a proportional hazard
function model. They tested several hypotheses about which
factors influence the time until the completion of each of the two
stages. The factors they considered include the number of
potential customers, product design expenditures, engineering
expenditures, and the number of concurrent projects. 
The current study extends Datar et al.(1997b)’s research in the
sense that it incorporates into the model the relational structure
of competing firms’ new product launch hazard rates.
Specifically, Datar et al.(1997b) assumed that the time-to-
market, whether it is prototype release or volume production,
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depends only on the firm’s own capabilities and efforts, thereby
ignoring one of key characteristics of high-tech industry, i.e.
competition. Their assumption may hold if becoming first in
introducing a new product is the only goal that a firm may
pursue, since they just need to work hard without worrying
about the competitor’s time-based strategy. However, a firm may
well be responsive to the competitor’s behavior if it wants to
optimize their new product launch timing by achieving first-
mover advantages while minimizing costs of head-to-head
competition.
RESEARCH QUESTION
Among practical managers as well as academicians, it is now
well accepted that there exists a tradeoff between market
preemption(so called “first-mover advantage”) vs. minimizing
market development costs and uncertainty(“late-mover
advantage”). Therefore, a firm would want to optimally choose its
market entry timing to maximize profit by avoiding possible
substantial costs from both immature entry and missed
opportunity. In high-tech industries such as telecommunication
devices and computer software, the timing decision becomes
much more difficult due to high uncertainty1) and relatively high
switching cost. High cost of switching(e.g. operating system such
as Windows) provides a firm with more incentive to become a
technology leader since it can gain more valuable customers and
easily maintain their loyalty by making it harder to switch to
another product. We can easily find examples of firms that have
locked up the competition by “design-in” victories.
On the other hand, high uncertainty in both market and
technology not only makes firms hesitate to become a first-mover
but also tend to avoid head-to-head competition. Due to the fact
that the price competition is severe and that product
differentiation is relatively easy,2) high-tech firms feel more
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1) In their paper on high-tech marketing, Moriarty and Kosnik (1989)
characterize the world of high technology by high levels of both market
uncertainty and technological uncertainty.
2) There are two factors that facilitate differentiation of high-tech products.
First is fast-improving technology, which enables to develop products of 
inclined to become “unique” in their products than others do. In
addition, it is very critical in high-tech industry to become a
leader in a well-chosen segment rather than compete in an
attractive-to-all market(Moore 1991). Therefore, the competitor’s
product launch schedule(or its pattern) is an important factor a
firm should consider when making its own timing decision. In
sum, the timing of new product launch should always be
considered in relation to those of the rival firms. And thus, the
answer to the following question may be meaningful to both
academicians and practitioners.
Q: “Given the information on the imminence(hazard rate) of
rival firm’s new product introduction, would greater likelihood
(hazard rate) of rival product’s launch make a firm accelerate or
decelerate the launch of its new product?”
Clarification of the above question follows. First, the two
competing firms are assumed to be comparable in size and
market power. So, they are not like Microsoft and Netscape.
Second, this question is not about the equilibrium behavior of
firms. Rather, the focus of this paper is on a firm’s responsive
behavior to the marginal probability of rival firm’s new product
launch. Thirdly, I do not argue that the above question has a
universal answer. Instead, industry-specific and firm-specific
factors may well be taken into account. That is, our empirical
results may not be generalized to other industries. The main
purpose of this paper lies in illustrating how firms could utilize
the proposed model with their own data. Here are the two
competing propositions on the above question. 
Proposition 1: You should speed up, because you can attain
“pioneering advantage” if you become the first to market, or at
least you will be more likely to be within “lead-time threshold.”
Proposition 2: Slow down if the competitor’s product launch is
imminent, since it seems unwise to compete head-to-head in this
industry. You would be better off by waiting until the market
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better quality with better technology in relatively short time periods. The
second factor is that high-tech products generally have more flexibility
forimprovement due to many functions and features.
uncertainties clear up and differentiating your product from the
competitor’s.
Note that the answer to the question, i.e. the time-to-market
strategy of a firm, relies on whether the driving forces of the first
proposition dominate those of the second or vice versa. For
example, if the first-mover advantages prevail, firms would want
to become a pioneer by all means. Under that circumstance, if a
firm knew that its competitor is putting the final touches to their
product, the felt pressure to the firm would be so high that it
would try to do its best to expedite market entry. Proposition 1
seems more valid in this case. On the contrary, if the pioneering
advantage is more than offset by the potential costs of market
competition, a firm would tend to rather avoid competition and
fine-tune its new product.
The current research does not intend to give a normative
answer to the question. Rather, with real industry data, it aims
to answer the above hypothetical question by empirically
determining how the competing firms’ hazard rates for new
product introduction are related.
MODEL
Hazard Function Approach
Jain and Vilcassim(1991) first introduced the hazard function
approach to marketing field as an alternative method to
stochastic models for analyzing time-related variables. Helsen
and Schmittlein(1993) then demonstrated how effective hazard
rate models are in handling peculiar aspects of duration times.
Since then, we’ve seen the hazard function approach settling
down as a standard tool for analysis of duration times such as
household interpurchase times.
Though there are a variety of contexts where a hazard rate
model can be effectively used, this is one of the first studies in
marketing that addresses new product launch competition in
high-tech marketing context. Further, the current paper is
differentiated from others in that it focuses on the relational
structure of two competing hazards, instead of assuming
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independent hazard rates(cf. Gonul and Srinivasan 1993). 
In biometrics and econometrics literature, a reduced-form
approach assuming an ad hoc bivariate distribution has been
often used to study two interdependent hazard rates.
Alternatively, a recent paper by Fallick and Ryu(1997) takes
account of structural correlation between two competing
hazards. They examined lay-off unemployment spell and showed
a negative correlation between the hazard rate of job recall from
previous employer and that of new job acceptance. The current
paper mostly follows their empirical modeling approach with the
exception that we assume the two hazard rates(i.e. new product
launch hazard rates of competing firms) to be influencing each
other in both directions. Fallick and Ryu(1997) assumed that one
hazard rate(i.e. recall hazard) is exogenously given and that the
other hazard rate(i.e. new job) is affected by it, but not the other
direction, which seems to hold only in their specific application
context. 
Assumptions
Several assumptions are made to simplify the analysis. First,
we assume that there are two firms competing in a product
market who develop and market their own products. The two
firms are assumed to be comparable in size, R&D capability, and
in other measures of market power. Second, we also assume that
the two rival firms have limited knowledge about the competitor’s
new product development processes, including schedule. That is,
a firm is thought of as having no specific information about the
competitor’s new product development project such as the
amount of engineering expenditures. However, we suppose that
the firms know from experience their competitor’s average
behavior in the sense that they know the probability of its
competitor’s introducing a new product with the average level of
efforts. In other words, firms are not able to predict when the
competitor will launch new products(or release prototypes) due
to lack of knowledge about a certain project. However, from past
experience, a firm has a general knowledge of how much time
and money the other firm typically invests for a NPD project, and
of the conditional probability of new product launch at the
average level of investment. Technically speaking, we assume
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that a firm knows a baseline hazard rate of a competitor’s new
product launch, and the typical pattern of R&D spending and
other variables that influence(“shift”) the hazard rate. Combining
a baseline hazard rate with time-varying explanatory variables
such as typical R&D expenditure, a firm would have a general
sense of the competitor’s “normal” hazard rate of new product
launch.
Finally, in order to focus on the timing issue, other supply-side
factors such as quality are not considered in the model. Future
research may well endogenously determine the quality level of a
product since developing high-quality products generally needs
more time and expenditures. 
Time Durations
We define below the two competing time durations of interest
(T1 and T2).
T1 = time between concept introduction and new product
launch by firm A.3)
T2 = time between concept introduction and new product
launch by the rival firm(firm B).
Depending on the researcher’s interest, the new product
launch timing can be measured in two different ways. One is the
point of prototype release, and the other is the completion of
volume production. We take the first approach, i.e. prototype
release. In the context of high-tech marketing, prototype release
timing may seem more interesting to researchers than volume
production, since the former is more strategically chosen by
firms. Take software development as an example. A firm has
more flexibility in terms of timing of beta-version release, which
has potential flaws(“bugs”), than the volume production, which
happens after a strong commitment for the product has been
made.
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3) The duration of interest can also be the duration from technology availability
(within or outside industry) until new product launch. However, we define
the duration as that from concept introduction until prototype release since
it is not easy to determine when a new technology becomes available in most
cases.
Model Specification
A general form of mixed proportional hazard rate function is
the following.
The term r0(t) represents the baseline hazard, and exp(Xiβ) is
the proportionality term(i.e. observed heterogeneity), and the
final term “et” accounts for unobserved heterogeneity. Time-
varying explanatory variables (Xt) in our model may include
number of potential customers, engineering expenditure of the
focal firm, and so on.
As we explained in the previous section, companies are
assumed to have a general knowledge about the rival company’s
average behavior and thus normal(or “regular”) hazard rate of
new product introduction. Taking that into consideration, we can
rewrite the above equation as the following.
The notation r(t) represents “normal” hazard rate, which
implies the new product launch hazard rate at, say, typical
investment size.
To reflect the relational structure of hazard rates, we explicitly
model a firm’s new product introduction hazard rate as a
function of the competitor’s hazard rate. That is,
where i, j = 1 or 2, and Tj being the time of new product launch
by firm j. Note that we are assuming that the parameters α, β, γ,
δ do not depend on the index i. This is a realistic assumption if
h t
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we analyze competition between firms of comparable size and
power. However, we can easily relax this assumption by simply
introducing more parameters. 
More importantly, note that there are two different cases: t < Tj
and t ≥ Tj. In the latter case where a competitive firm has already
introduced a new product (t ≥ Tj), the follower firm’s new product
launch time is supposed to be affected in proportion to the
length of the lead-time (t – Tj). In other words, after a firm
observes the competitor launch a new product, it would be
motivated to expedite the development so that it may catch up
the pioneer firm within threshold. And the pressure would get
higher and higher as the lead-time increases. A positive value of
δ captures the effect.
On the other hand, in the first case where a firm hasn’t seen
the competitor’s product (t < Tj), it is not clear whether it would
increase or decrease the R&D pace. As previously discussed, a
firm may either want to speed up to become a pioneer
(Proposition 1) or wait and slow down until they can see what the
competitor has done(Proposition 2). Therefore, in the above
model specification, α captures the relational structure between
the two hazard rates. That is, α > 0 would support proposition 1,
whereas α < 0 would claim that proposition 2 is more
appropriate.
It might be questioned whether we should model the hazard
rate as a function of competitor’s hazard rate h(t) itself or only of
“normal” hazard r(t). As explained before, r(t) symbolizes limited
information about the competitor whereas h(t) would represent
the full information scenario where the focal firm has detailed
knowledge about its competitor. In this sense, r(t) provides more
conservative modeling approach. That is, showing that a firm’s
launch timing is affected even by a typical(average) pattern of the
rival firm’s behavior will be sufficient to argue that the two firms’
timing decisions with more knowledge(which is often the case in
reality) would be correlated more heavily.
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ESTIMATION
Baseline hazard function
The hazard function for firm A can be rewritten as follows.
where r10(t) and r20(t) are baseline hazard functions for firms A
and B, respectively. To estimate the parameters, we should first
determine which parametric model to use for baseline hazard
function.
The econometrics literature contains a number of choices for
hazard functions, including exponential, Weibull, log-normal,
log-logistic, gamma and many others. With no prior knowledge
about the functional shape, a step function may also be
considered. However, in terms of parsimony, Weibull distribution
can be thought of as a strong candidate. Weibull distribution
also has a nice property that it is monotonically increasing or
decreasing depending on the parameter, which seems plausible
in our application context.4)
The hazard function of Weibull distribution is the following.5)
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4) In terms of parsimony, exponential distribution might be the best. However,
it assumes constant hazard rates across time, which is unrealistic.
5) The Weibull hazard function monotonically increases if φ > 1 (or b > 0), and
decreases when φ < 1 (or b < 0).
where b = φ – 1. Therefore, by adopting Weibull distribution as
the baseline hazard function, we have now six parameters to
estimate.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Maximum likelihood method is used for model estimation.
Suppose that the firms A and B compete in the same product
market and that the firm A launched the new product at t1 (i.e.
T1 = t1) and the firm B at t2 (i.e. T2 = t2). Since the duration data
are interval censored,6) the joint probability that the two firms
launch the new products at t1 and t2 will be expressed as P(t1–1 <
T1 ≤ t1, t2–1 < T2 ≤ t2). Recall that T1 and T2 are related through
the two firms’ competitive behavior, and are reflected in their
new product launch hazard functions. Since our model fully
reflects the relational structure in the specification of r1(t) and
r2(t), it is not unreasonable to assume that T1 and T2 are
independent given r1(t) and r2(t). Therefore, P(t1–1 < T1 ≤ t1, t2–1 <
T2 ≤ t2) = P(t1–1 < T1 ≤ t1) P(t2–1 < T2 ≤ t2). This probability is the
likelihood contribution of each observation(project). To compute
these probabilities, we need to know which of the following cases
each observation belongs to.
(1) Case 1: Firm A introduces a new product first, i.e. t1 < t2.
(2) Case 2: Firm B introduces a new product first, i.e. t1 > t2.
(3) Case 3: Firm A and B introduce new products in the same
period, i.e. t1 = t2.
The likelihood contribution of each observation is computed
from the following formula using corresponding hazard
functions. 
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6) An observation is interval censored if all you know about T is that a < T < b,
for some values of a and b. For duration data, this sort of censoring is likely
to occur when observations are made at infrequent intervals (e.g. quarterly)
and there is no way to get retrospective information on the exact timing of
events.
where S(t) is the survival function, and R(t) is the integrated
hazard rates. R(t) is computed as the following.
For unobserved heterogeneity, we assume a bivariate discrete
distribution proposed by Heckman and Singer(1984). That is,
(e1t, e2t) follows a discrete bivariate distribution which takes
value of (e1ti, e2tj) with probability pij, i = 1, …, I and j =1, …, J.
Here, I and J denote the number of support points for e1t and e2t.
Since 0 ≤ pij ≤1, for computational convenience, it is better to use
unbounded parameter qij to represent pij’s as follows.
By taking the expectation with regard to e1t and e2t, we can
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To examine how well the proposed method could capture the
structural relationship between hazard rates, an exploratory
Monte-Carlo simulation study was carried out. 
Assumptions
For expository purpose, a few simplifying assumptions are
made. First, we assume away the unobserved heterogeneity
across NPD projects as well as across firms. That is, e1t = e2t = 0
for all t. For observed heterogeneity, we consider only one
explanatory variable (Xit) and its typical pattern over time (
–Xit).
Second, it is assumed that a new product development project of
each firm starts in the same period. That is, the starting points
of the two firms’ NPD durations are synchronized. Under limited
information, this assumption doesn’t seem to be too unrealistic
because a firm would tend to assume that the rival firm might
also have begun the development about the same time. Finally,
we assume that the parameters (α, β, γ, δ) are the same between
the two firms. The true parameter values are: α = 0.2 and –0.5, β
= 0.5, γ = 0, δ = 0.3. As discussed in model specification, the sign
of parameter α would suggest which proposition is empirically
supported. Since we don’t have real data, the current simulation
study covers both scenarios. As for parameter δ, we believe that
it should always be positive.
Procedures
For each of the two different scenarios, α > 0 and α < 0, 100
observations are generated according to the following procedure.
First, typical patterns of explanatory variable Xit (e.g. R&D
expenditure) over time are assumed for firms A and B. (From
now on, let us use “R&D expenditure” for the explanatory
 
P t T t E P t T t e e
P P t T t e e r







( ) [ ( | ,  )]
                     ( | ,  ),  , .
− < ≤ = − < ≤








How Does Competition Affect High-Tech Firms’ Time-to-Market Decision? 55
variable in order to facilitate exposition.) To eliminate the
possible multicollinearity problem, the two firms are supposed to
have different R&D spending patterns such that firm A increases
R&D expenditure over time and firm B tends to spend the same
level of amount over time. However, the size of the total spending
is set to be comparable between the two companies. The figure
below shows the general pattern of R&D spending for the two
firms.
Secondly, the actual R&D expenditures for firm A (X1t) and firm
B (X2t) are determined by multiplying a normal error term with
mean 1.0 and variance σ2 to the patterns described above. I.e.,
Xit =  
–Xit × εit, where εit ~N(1, σ2). The standard deviation σ = 0.1
was chosen so that 95% of the observations are to be within 20%
deviation from the mean (P(0.8 < εit <1.2) = 0.95). This way, we
get the values of R&D spending (Xit) as deviating in proportion
from the typical pattern ( –Xit) instead of having same scale of
variations regardless of the size of typical spending.
Finally, given the values of explanatory variables and the
reasonably chosen baseline hazard functions, the weekly hazard
rates are computed using the formula given in the previous
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section. The baseline hazard functions, which are assumed to be
the same for both firms, are:
r0(t) = exp(–4 + 0.2 ln t)     for scenario 1 (α = 0.2), and
r0(t) = exp(–6 + 0.1 ln t)     for scenario 2 (α = –0.5).
Now, consider the fact that, with small time intervals, the
hazard rate h(t) is approximated by the conditional probability
that an event would occur at time t given that it has not occurred
by t–1. That is,
when ∆t = 1.
Accordingly, we are able to determine the time duration until a
new product launch is made by one of the two firms by drawing
a random number and comparing against the hazard rate of the
specific period. Specifically, a random draw was made from a
uniform distribution U (0,1) and compared with the
corresponding hazard rate computed above, to decide whether an
event(i.e. new product launch) has occurred. If the random
number is smaller than the hazard rate, we suppose that the
firm introduced a new product in the corresponding period
(week). Otherwise, we move along to the next period and repeat
the same procedure. Note that once an event occurs to a firm,
the hazard rate of the other firm changes into a different
functional form that includes δ term. From the scenario 1 (α =
0.2), firm A first introduced a new product in 39 observations
(out of 100), and firm B turned out to be a pioneer in 57
observations. For the four remaining observations, both firms
introduced new products in the same week. Therefore, the
proportion of T1 < T2 is 0.39. The scenario 2 (α = –0.5) yielded 44
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7) There are more observations that represent firm B’s lead than those that
imply firm A’s. This is partly due to the fact that firm B’s the R&D
expenditure levels are generally higher in earlier periods (weeks 1-50), when
most events have occurred, although the total expenditures are set to be 
Average duration times for scenario 1 was 24 weeks, and 13.7
weeks for scenario 2, which doesn’t seem too unreasonable as
prototype development durations of high-tech products.
Estimation Results
Based on the proposed model, the parameters are estimated
using the simulated observations for each of the two scenarios.
The estimation results for scenario 1 are summarized in Table
1(a). The parameter estimates are close to the true values, and
some of the estimates are statistically significant.8) For example,
the “catch-up” behavior is well captured by the parameter δ =
0.35, whose true value is 0.3, and it was significantly different
from zero (t = 8.14). And, the parameter of our major concern,
which is α, was estimated as 0.19 that is very close to the true
value 0.2, though not statistically significant. However, this
result relies on the set of data generated under certain parameter
values, and therefore should not be generalized. In other words,
if we’d chosen a much smaller value of δ, say 0.05, in generating
observations, we might not have gotten strong effect of δ.
Therefore, dominance of δ effect does not come from the model
itself but from the choice of true parameter values. Table 1(b)
summarizes similar estimation results for scenario 2.9)
After justifying our method, I further investigated the modeling
possibilities using real data. The dataset came from part of the
data used by Datar et al.(1997b). With two explanatory variables,
CUST(number of customers expressing intent to buy) and ENGG
(engineering expenditure for new product development), the
proposed model was calibrated three times. Model 1 of Table 2
summarizes the estimation results for the model having no
heterogeneous parameters, i.e. same coefficients for the two
competing firms. Model 2 has heterogeneous parameters but
doesn’t incorporate unobserved heterogeneity. Model 3 has both
of them. 
The estimation results in Table 2 indicate that in this case the
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almost equal for the whole period of consideration (120 weeks). 
8) Note that the true value for γ was set to be zero, and the estimate is expected
to be not statistically significant.
9) The limited simulation study indicates the need for a large number of
observations.
two firms compete in a way that supports proposition 1, i.e.
acceleration. The alpha coefficient is positive in two of the three
models. Model 1 only has non-significant alpha, possibly due to
specification error in heterogeneities. The alpha coefficients of
Model 2 and Model 3 are similar in size and statistically
significant, whereas the covariate effects of two time-varying
variables differ across the two firms.
The baseline hazards were estimated with a step-function(of 6
levels). Except the early periods of Model 3, the baseline hazards
tend to increase over time, which suggests that Weibull may be a
good alternative. Further, the positive “lead time” effect(reflected
by delta coefficients) was also secured. That is, the pressure of
catching up gets higher as the lead time increases. Although the
interpretation of the estimation results warrants caution, it
somehow represents the validity and usefulness of the proposed
model. 
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Table 1. Simulation Results
(a) Simulation Results: Scenario 1*
parameters Estimates standard error t-statistic p-value
a -4.2547 2.2200 -1.917 0.0276
b 0.2081 0.1881 1.106 0.1343
α 0.1890 0.6994 0.270 0.3935
β 0.7965 0.5429 1.467 0.0712
γ -0.1032 1.8961 -0.054 0.4783
δ 0.3495 0.0429 8.140 0.0000
*True parameter values are a = -4, b = 0.2, α = 0.2, β = 0.5, γ = 0, δ = 0.3.
(b) Simulation Results: Scenario 2*
parameters estimates standard error t-statistic p-value
a -6.4591 9.7163 -0.665 0.2531
b 0.2402 0.3323 0.723 0.2349
α -0.5258 0.7684 -0.684 0.2469
β 0.6038 0.4177 1.446 0.0741
γ -0.5084 9.2594 -0.055 0.4781
δ 0.3366 0.0430 7.829 0.0000
*True parameter values are a = -6, b = 0.1, α = -0.5, β = 0.5, γ = 0, δ = 0.3.
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Table 2. Estimation Results from Datar et al.(1997b) data









firm A firm B
a1 -9.576 b1 -9.927
a2 0.617 b2 0.446
a3 2.108 b3 2.621
a4 3.105 b4 5.407
a5 4.068 b5 5.181
a6 10.506 b6 8.132
(b) Model 2: heterogeneous parameters
Parameters Estimates
alpha(corr) 1.048
firm A firm B
beta1(CUST) 12.703 beta1(CUST) -3.242
beta2(ENGG) -18.384
beta2(ENGG) -5.516
gamma 3.525 gamma -0.493
delta 0.147 delta 1.593
a1 -8.207 b1 -9.542
a2 8.296 b2 -6.508
a3 3.052 b3 0.756
a4 4.103 b4 2.332
a5 7.397 b5 2.228
a6 12.519 b6 9.466
CONCLUSION
There are several limitations to be addressed. First, our
empirical question couldn’t be answered due to lack of real data.
Instead, we illustrated how we can perform the analysis by
carrying out two simulations. Therefore, if we could obtain any
real data containing information on competitive new product
development such as launch timing and R&D expenditures, we
might be able to answer which proposition better explains the
time-based competition in a certain high-tech product market.
With real data, we can also gain insights about how critical it is
for a firm to keep up with the rival firms in a certain market. The
second limitation of our study relies on the lack of ability to
explain the competitive behavior of firms in equilibrium. More
rigorous analytical modeling approach can provide better
understanding of the R&D race and facilitate developing better
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Table 2. continued








firm A firm B
beta1(CUST) 12.642 beta1(CUST) -3.963
beta2(ENGG) -18.093 beta2(ENGG) -5.592
gamma -5.741 gamma 0.995
delta 0.135 delta 1.639
a1 -8.378 b1 -13.426
a2 18.396 b2 -24.159
a3 -6.018 b3 2.308
a4 -4.957 b4 3.907
a5 -1.799 b5 3.827
a6 16.969 b6 8.504
*q11, e1, v1 set to be zero for identification
empirical model.
In addition, the R&D acceleration vs. deceleration decision is
likely to depend on the characteristics of product markets. Thus,
one of the valuable future research venues is the identification of
variables that affect or moderate the decisions.10)
Despite the limitations, this paper has made several
contributions in the following sense. First, this is the one of the
first attempts in marketing that examines R&D competition
using duration analysis. Time-based strategies are extremely
important in high-technology based industries such as electronic
devices and software. Second, from a modeling perspective, the
hazard function approach has a lot of potential for analyzing
time-based competition. And the current paper demonstrated for
the first time in the marketing literature the possibility to
capture the relational structure between competing hazard rates.
Although we assumed two hazard rates, the model can be
extended to cases where three or more hazard functions are
involved. 
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